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PANEL I: Trademark Dilution: Moseley
and Beyond
Moderator:
Panelists:

Barton Beebe∗
Cecelia Dempsey†
Marie Driscoll‡
Hugh C. Hansen§
Susan Progoff||

PROFESSOR BEEBE: I was honored to be invited to moderate
this panel. When I found out who was going to be on it, I was not
only honored, but also very excited to show up today and hear the
comments about trademark dilution. This is a burning issue in
trademark law, and there is no better place to discuss it than in
New York, with New York lawyers who are practitioners of
trademark and who are really the top of their profession. So, this is
a real treat.
What I’ll do right now is introduce who is on this panel, and
then I’ll say maybe sixty seconds on what this case is about. The
subject of our case study, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., was
handed down by the Supreme Court in March 2003.1 Then we’ll
move on to a little history of dilution and a pro-and-con discussion
of dilution. Professor Hansen will conclude with the future of
dilution.
So, who is on this panel? Cecelia Dempsey is a graduate of
Fordham University School of Law and is currently Senior
∗

Professor, Cardozo School of Law. B.A., University of Chicago, 1992; Ph.D.,
Princeton University, 1998; J.D., Yale Law School, 2000.
†
Senior Trademark Counsel, Corporate Services, Altria Corporation. B.A., University
of Notre Dame, 1982; J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1985.
‡
Partner, Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Driscoll, P.C. B.S., summa cum laude,
Georgetown University, 1960; LL.B, Harvard Law School, 1963.
§
Professor, Fordham University School of Law. A.B., Rutgers University, 1968; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1972; L.L.M., Yale Law School, 1977.
||
Partner, Fish & Neave. B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1974; M.S., University of
Florida, 1976; J.D., cum laude, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1979.
1
537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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Trademark Counsel at Altria Corporate Services, Inc. Marie
Driscoll is a partner at Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Zissu, P.C., a
premier intellectual property firm in New York, and thus, in the
nation, and argued in front of the Supreme Court in Inwood Labs,
Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc.,2 which is a really important trademark case.
Sue Progoff is a partner at Fish & Neave, another premier
intellectual property firm in New York. Professor Hugh Hansen
needs no introduction, I think, in these circles. He is a professor
here at Fordham and is a prominent name, especially in issues
relating to international intellectual property law.
Let me say a few words about what this case is about and its
history, and then we can get right into a discussion of the doctrine
of trademark dilution. This case began in 1998,3 and it has these
bizarre facts in which an Army colonel was offended by an
advertisement he received.4 It was an advertisement for a store in
Kentucky that was called Victor’s Secret.5 This was a store that
sold, among other things, lingerie and adult toys and various other
devices, which the Supreme Court describes at length in a footnote
in this opinion.6 Yet, he was not necessarily offended by the
content of these devices or their obscenity or indecency.7 He was
offended, however, as he wrote in a letter to Victoria’s Secret, by
the unfair trade practices of the Victor’s Secret store.8 He thought
it was unfair that they were appropriating some of the goodwill or
commercial energy of the Victoria’s Secret catalogue.9
Well, Victoria’s Secret got this letter, and their lawyers
responded. They filed a claim for, among other things, trademark
confusion.10 Here, trademark confusion is confusion of consumers
as to source. For example, if I were to walk up to Victor’s Secret
store and think it is somehow affiliated with Victoria’s Secret.
2

456 U.S. 844 (1982).
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1092 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9,
2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d and remanded, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
4
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423.
5
See id.
6
See id. at 424 n.4.
7
See id. at 423.
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
See id.
3
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This is also dilution of the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the
Victoria’s Secret trademark.11 As I understand it, at the district
court level Victoria’s Secret won on all claimshowever, I could
be wrong.12 At the Sixth Circuit, the district court opinion was
affirmed.13 Here, the main issue, which eventually came before
the Supreme Court, was whether the plaintiff in an anti-dilution
action has to show merely a likelihood of dilution or, rather, actual
dilution.14
In the consumer confusion context, all that is required is a
showing of a likelihood of confusion.15 The problem is that the
Lanham Act16 appears to say that you must show actual dilution in
order to receive an injunction based on dilution.17 The Fourth
Circuit, as an example of a circuit that had gone the other way, said
that a plaintiff must show actual dilution.18 The Sixth Circuit said
that a plaintiff need only show a likelihood of dilution.19
The case went before the Supreme Court, and the conclusion of
the Court was that the plaintiff must show actual dilution, which—
and I think most people would agree—is an extremely hard
standard to meet.20 Since this case, the trademark bar has
considered various ways to legislatively overrule this case.21
11

See id. at 423–24.
See Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095–96 (ruling in favor of Victoria’s Secret
on its dilution claim only, and in defendants’ favor on issues of both trademark confusion
and infringement).
13
Moseley, 259 F.3d 464.
14
Id.
15
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2003) (providing that any person who uses in commerce
“any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion . . . shall be
liable in a civil action”).
16
Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act], Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2003)).
17
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432–33 (noting that the Lanham Act, as amended by the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”), “unambiguously requires a showing of
actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution” in order to obtain injunctive relief).
18
See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460–65 (4th Cir. 1999).
19
Moseley, 259 F.3d at 475–76.
20
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
21
For a discussion of recent criticism since Moseley was decided, see Brian A. Jacobs,
Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (2004)
12
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So, that is a very short introduction. We’ll talk more about the
details of the case.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Let me just say one thing. The
district court actually granted summary judgment against
Victoria’s Secret on the trademark infringement and unfair
competition claims.22
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Right.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That was not appealed. All that went
up on appeal to the Sixth Circuit was dilution.23
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Right, just blurring dilution, which
we’ll get into. I will just leave it there and we can get into that
during our discussion. So, with that brief introduction, let’s move
on to the history of the concept of trademark dilution. I’ll turn it
over to Marie Driscoll.
MS. DRISCOLL: My task here is to talk about the history of
trademark protection so that we can hopefully determine two
things. First, how dilution came to be a concept of interest to
trademark owners and, second, why courts have had such a very
difficult time in applying the law.
I’ll go back, first, to the Act of 1905, which is the federal
trademark statute that the United States operated under from 1905
to 1946.24 At that time, the standard for civil actions was that a
defendant would be liable if it made a colorable imitation of a
trademark affixed to goods of substantially the same descriptive
properties as those of the trademark owner.25 As you can see, this
is very narrow. If you used a trademark for an automobile, you
(stating that the Supreme Court’s decision is inadequate to remedy the problems of the
FTDA). Jacobs proposes that
[c]ourts should begin by asking whether consumers will mentally associate the
defendant’s mark with the plaintiff’s mark, but the analysis should not end
there. Courts should go on to ask, first, whether the junior mark adequately
distinguishes itself from the senior mark and, second, whether the junior mark’s
reference to the senior mark provides useful information.
Id. at 165.
22
See Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095–96.
23
See Moseley, 259 F.3d at 466.
24
Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, ch. 104, 33 Stat. 724 (1905).
25
See id.
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could stop someone else from using essentially the same mark on
an automobile, but the law didn’t go much beyond that.26
Trademark owners started to chafe against these limits to
protection. During the 1920s, two things happened. One is that a
lawyer named Frank Schechter, who happened to be trademark
counsel for the BVD Company, and presumably was motivated
because he was not getting the kind of protection he wanted for his
famous BVD mark, wrote an article called “The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection.”27 As a result, he is generally considered to
be the father of dilution.28
Schechter argued that trademark law previously had been
perceived as needing to prevent the deception of consumers,
which, of course, is always one aspect of trademark law.29 In other
words, if you go in to buy a Buick car, you expect it to be from the
same company that you purchased a Buick car from five years ago.
Here, protection exists for the consumer. It was also generally
considered that trademarks did not exist in gross.30 In other words,
a trademark was not a piece of property, like a book or a record.31
It signified something. You couldn’t steal a trademark. You had
to fit it into the concepts of likelihood of confusion.32
Schechter saw trademarks in a somewhat different light. In his
article, he spoke of the value of a modern trademark being in its
selling power.33 He explained that the selling power depends on
the psychological hold of that trademark upon the public. This
grasp signifies not only the merit of the goods on which the
26

See id.
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 825 (1926) (urging that trademarks be protected against even trivial non-competing
uses of the mark, which over time would cause a “gradual whittling away or dispersion of
the identity . . . of the mark”).
28
See, e.g., Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited:
Putting the Dilution Doctrine Into Context, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 375, 377 (2000) (observing that the “idea of protecting trademarks in the absence of
a likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers began with an article that Frank
Schechter wrote for the Harvard Law Review in 1927”).
29
See Schechter, supra note 27, at 816, 819.
30
See id. at 818.
31
See id.
32
See id. at 818, 821.
33
See id. at 831.
27
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trademark is used, but also the uniqueness and singularity of the
trademark.34 In other words, if you thought of Buick, all you
thought of was an automobile; you didn’t think of anything else.35
Schechter also took the next step, which is the basis of what we
now consider dilution, namely that “the uniqueness of the mark is
impaired if others use it on either related goods or non-related
goods.”36
And finally, not all marks are entitled to this kind of protection.
The degree of protection, Schechter noted, “depends on the extent
to which, through the efforts of its owner, the mark is actually
unique and different from other marks.”37 I might add that in
analyzing the issue, Schechter presented examples of famous
marks that would be entitled to dilution protection, including some
that we still know eighty years later, such as Rolls Royce, Aunt
Jemima, and Kodak.38 Of course, he also came up with something
called Blue Goose and Nujol, but they have fallen by the
wayside.39
But the point is that there are some marks that, in his view and
in the view of many courts, are such household words, so unique
and famous, that you don’t have to prove that consumers are going
to think that you, the trademark owner, are responsible for the
defendant’s product, have licensed it, are associated with it, and
somehow have authorized it.40 The theory is that if you have a
trademark of that stature, you should be entitled to protect it
against all use.41

34

See id.
See id. at 818–19.
36
Id. at 831.
37
Id.
38
See id. at 829.
39
See id.
40
See id. at 831 (arguing that the “preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should
constitute the only rational basis for its protection”).
41
See id. at 828–31 (concluding that broader protection should be given to coined,
arbitrary or fanciful words or phrases, which are “associated in the public mind with a
particular product” and arguing that a mark’s “uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or
impaired by its use upon either related on non-related goods”).
35

2 PANEL I FORMAT

2004]

8/6/2004 2:57 PM

MOSELEY AND BEYOND

855

Now, about the same time in 1928, Learned Hand wrote a
decision in a case called Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson.42 The
plaintiff in that case used Yale on locks, and the defendant started
to use Yale on flashlights.43 These are not goods of the same
descriptive quality.44 In his opinion, however, Judge Hand upheld
the protection of Yale Lock’s name, even though he had to cope
with a statute that said that the goods had to be of “substantially
the same descriptive properties.”45 In doing so, he said a lot about
trademarks that plaintiffs love to quote even today, again eighty
years later. Judge Hand said that
it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may
have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark
outside the field of his own exploitation to justify
interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic seal; by
it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his
name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the
owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within has
own control. This is an injury, even though the borrower
does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a
reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and
creator, and another can use it only as a mask. And so it
has come to be recognized that, unless the borrower’s use is
so foreign to the owner’s as to insure against any
identification of the two, it is unlawful.46
So, he hasn’t gone the whole way, as Schechter did, to protect
against unrelated goods, but Judge Hand did give a germ of an idea
to other courts that allowed for considerable broadening of the
breadth of protection that one would get under the Act of 1905.47
42
26 F.2d 972, 973–74 (2d Cir. 1928) (holding that flashlight manufacturer’s attempt
to register a mark containing the word “Yale” was properly refused).
43
See id. at 973.
44
See id. at 974.
45
See id.; see also Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, ch. 104, 33 Stat. 724
(1905).
46
Yale Elec., 26 F.2d at 974 (citing Wall v. Rolls-Royce, 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925);
Akron-Overland v. Willys-Overland, 273 F. 674 (3d Cir. 1921); Vogue Co. v.
Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney,
247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917)).
47
Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, ch. 104, 33 Stat. 724 (1905).
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Now, several things happened in accordance with this attempt to
broaden the protection to which trademark owners were entitled.
First, the Lanham Act was amended in 1946.48 Under this
revision, the requirement that goods be of substantially the same
descriptive properties was eliminated. A trademark owner was
entitled to protection when his or her mark or a similar mark was
placed on goods or services, and the use was “likely to cause
confusion, mistake, or deception.”49 That is one of the principles
that is still part of our federal trademark act.
There was no impetus, however, toward any kind of federal
dilution act. Instead, in 1946 Congress added section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act,50 which some people consider a federal law of unfair
competition, but which has proved to be the vehicle by which
courts have steadily broadened the scope of protection for
trademark owners.
Originally, section 43(a) prohibited use of “false designations
of origin” and “false descriptions” or representations about goods
or services.51 This initially went into the Lanham Act to prevent
use of, for example, the word “Idaho” on potatoes that weren’t
from Idaho.52 One of the famous marks banned under section
43(a) was “Glass Wax” for a glass cleaner that did not contain
wax.53 This statute was broadened considerably by courts, and the
courts began to hold that false designation of origin and false
descriptions as to source included the use of trademarks that falsely
would suggest or indicate to people that the goods were from the
same origin as the first user. In other words, it’s a slightly broader
reading of the straight infringement part of the statute.

48

Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1051–1129 (2003)).
49
15 U.S.C. § 1114.
50
See Lanham Act §43(a).
51
Id.
52
See id.
53
See Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 939–40 (D.D.C. 1955) (holding that
the words “glass wax” for a glass cleaner and polish that contained no wax were
deceptively misdescriptive under the Lanham Act).
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The Trademark Law Revision Act subsequently changed the
law to recognize the progress made by courts.54 The reason I am
going to mention this is because the revised statute, in my mind,
gives a very considerable amount of protection to famous marks.
Under the new section 43(a), a term that is likely to cause
confusion or mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another is actionable.55 These
are very, very broad concepts.
I see that I don’t have much time left. But to go back to strict
dilution, while the federal government was not interested, several
states passed dilution statutes. Right now, we have fifteen states
that only require a showing of likelihood of dilution.56 One of
them, Texas, does not even require that the mark be famous.57
Thirteen states have absolutely no dilution protection by statute.58
Twenty-two states have passed a model state law that has the same
dilution language as the federal law that just has been interpreted
in Moseley, and therefore, suffer from the same problems as the
federal statute.59
There was a groundswell in the 1980s by the trademark bar to
get a federal dilution statute.60 Sometimes when you get your wish
you are sorry afterward. And I think that probably has happened in
this instance because of the particular way in which the statute has
been interpreted. Originally, when the trademark law was revised
54

See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2003)).
55
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
56
See Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., the
Internet, and Intell. Prop., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of the Honorable Howard L.
Berman), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/berman021402.htm (last visited
Mar. 30, 2004).
57
See Texas Anti-Dilution Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2004).
58
See Int’l Trademark Ass’n, US State Chart of Anti-Dilution Statutes, available at
http://www.inta.org/policy/mstb_antidilution.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
59
See, e.g., Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for “Famous”
Trademarks: Anti-Competitive “Monopoly” or Earned “Property” Right?, 47 FLA. L.
REV. 653, 656 n.12 (1995).
60
See Gale R. Peterson, Overview of Intellectual Property, in UNDERSTANDING THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 2003, at 11, 179 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks,
& Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-01BF, 2003) (noting that First
Amendment violation concerns prevented a federal anti-dilution statute in 1988).
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to add an “intent to use” section, there was also a proposal before
Congress that dilution be added.61 There was a lot of resistance
from the media because it was afraid that the statute could be
interpreted to limit First Amendment rights, and thus, Congress
wouldn’t even look at it.62 Years later, in the 1990s, Congress
revisited the issue and the present statute was passed.63
Since then, the courts have had a lot of difficulty in dealing
with the dilution statute.64 This is possibly because the entire
history of marks protection had caused confusion or required proof
of association or affiliation.65 There have been cases in which
courts have had to face the issue of whether or not fame in a niche
market is sufficient.66 There have been cases in which the courts
have had to consider whether they can protect a famous mark that
is not inherently distinctive as opposed to one that required a
finding of secondary meaning.67 The cases have been all over the
place, even within circuits.
I’ll end by saying that I was involved in the first dilution case
that was decided by the Second Circuit.68 It involved crackers in
the shape of fish.69 The Pepperidge Farm people claimed that use
of a fish by Nabisco was an infringement and a dilution of their
rights in the fish.70

61

See id.
See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028 (1988)).
63
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000).
64
See, e.g., Julie C. Frymark, Trademark Dilution: A Proposal to Stop the Infection
From Spreading, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 165, 187–202 (2003) (reviewing cases that involve
dilution statutes).
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that as a matter of law, Zazu’s hair products sales were “insufficient to establish national
trademark rights” when L’Oreal placed its similar hair care products on the market).
67
See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 789 (5th
Cir. 1983) (affirming the district court’s decision that although the “Fish-Fri” mark had
acquired secondary meaning, the “defendants were entitled to use the term ‘fishfry’ under
the fair use doctrine as a descriptive characteristic of the product”).
68
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that there was
a likelihood of success for defendants’ counterclaim concerning trademark infringement).
69
See id. at 212.
70
See id. at 213–14.
62
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In this case, Pepperidge Farm was not able to get a registration
of its fish without showing secondary meaning. Indeed, with
configurations of a product, such as the shape of a fish, you have to
show secondary meaning.71 The court nonetheless gave protection
to the fish under the dilution statute.72 A few years later, the same
court held, in another case involving “The Children’s Place,” that it
would not give protection under the federal dilution statute to a
trademark that had to show secondary meaning and was not
inherently distinctive.73
So, as you can seeand this is only a very small
picturethere has been chaos in the way that courts have tried to
wrestle with a statute that, frankly, has concepts in it that they are
not used to; that suggests protection of a trademark in gross,
something that has been drilled into their heads for years, as not
appropriate; that treats trademark as a property right and goes
beyond protection of consumers from confusion. The courts are
having a tremendous time wrestling with this concept.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Cecelia?
MS. DEMPSEY: I’m not sorry that there is a federal dilution
cause of action. I believe that dilution is very real. One of my jobs
as a corporate lawyer is to protect some famous marks. I think
dilution is very real, and it is very damaging; it’s just hard to
prove. And if there is a damage out there, I think that there should
be a cause of action to protect it.
Just like Marie, I’m sitting here with Frank Schechter’s
article.74 I’m thinking that I must have a hard argument to make if
I’m relying on a 1927 law review article as my main argument.
But, as Frank Schechter said, “[I]f ‘Kodak’ may be used for
bathtubs and cakes, ‘Mazda’ for cameras and shoes, or ‘Ritz
71

See id. at 215–16.
See id. at 228–29.
73
TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 96–97 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding that the FTDA protects a narrower range of marks than does the Lanham
Act and that acquired distinctiveness does not fulfill the distinctiveness requirement of
the FTDA).
74
See Schechter, supra note 27.
72
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Carlton’ for coffee, these marks must inevitably be lost in the
commonplace words of the language, despite the originality and
the ingenuity of their contrivance.”75
I think, as Frank Schechter stated, “[I]t’s the mark that actually
sells the goods, and, self-evidently, the more distinctive the mark,
the more effective is its selling power.”76 I think that is what the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act represented, that selling power.77
To the extent your trademark protects goods that may be more of a
commodity. I think that the selling power of that mark is that
much more important.
There are really two types of harm, types of dilution. One is
blurring, which is the whittling-away or the dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name on
non-competing or competing goods.78 There is also tarnishment,
which is the degradation or dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark.79
It is important that dilution relief be limited to famous and
distinctive marks. For example, United Airlines, which is not
necessarily a very distinctive mark, may not be entitled to the same
dilution protection as some other, more distinctive famous marks.
I think also, as Marie was touching upon, we should not be
giving dilution relief in particular niches. I think that the courts
got into trouble when they were finding a cause of action for
dilution in a particular niche market. In these cases, you really had
to be familiar with, for example, computers, motorcycles, maybe
golf clubs, or something like that to truly know if the mark in
question was famous.

75

Id. at 830.
Id.
77
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000).
78
See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031
(2d Cir. 1989) (defining blurring as “the whittling away of an established trademark’s
selling power and value through its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar marks”)
(citing Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d, 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983)).
79
See id. at 1031; see also Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir.
1994) (stating that “‘tarnishment’ generally arises when the plaintiff’s trademark is linked
to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context
likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product”).
76
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Since Moseley has been decided it is much more difficult for
trademark owners to prove dilution. Obviously, the Court left
open in Moseley the notion that if the marks were the same
whether you could show dilution through circumstantial
evidence.80 My evidence is that since Moseley there have been
several cases.81 About half found sufficient evidence of actual
dilution,82 and the other half found that the burden of proof had not
been met.83
Of those that were successful in proving actual dilution, all
were based upon circumstantial evidence, so that the marks were
considered either identical or virtually identical.84 I think that the
courts should have some leeway in terms of what is identical. It
shouldn’t be a situation, like in Europe, with the Office of
Harmonization for Internal Markets, where it has to be the exact
mark.85 I think that if it is a close similarity—there should be a
determination that the marks are the same or similar—it is enough
to show actual dilution through circumstantial evidence.
I think that the Supreme Court in Moseley left open the notion
that you could show actual dilution, leaving it to the practitioners
to show it.86 Certainly, to the extent that the marks were not the
same, the Court suggested that one could show actual dilution.
The Court sent us to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Ringling
Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division
80

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003).
Cf. Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003); Enterprise Rent-A-Car
Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Scott Fetzer
Co. v. Gehring, 288 F. Supp. 2d 696, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1893 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
82
Cf. Scott Fetzer Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d at 702; Pinehurst, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
83
Cf. Nitro Leisure Prods., 341 F.3d 1356; Kellogg Co., 337 F.3d 616; Enterprise
Rent-A-Car Co., 330 F.3d 1333, 1338; Savin Corp., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1893.
84
Cf. Scott Fetzer Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (noting that the defendant’s marks are
identical to those of the plaintiff); Pinehurst, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 428 (stating that
defendant’s marks are indisputably identical to plaintiff’s federal service marks).
85
The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market was established by an European
Community Council Regulation on December 20, 1993 to carry out registration
procedures for European Community trademarks. See Office for Harmonization in the
Internal Mkt., at http://oami.eu.int/en (last updated Mar. 29, 2004).
86
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
81
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of Travel Development.87 First, dilution can be shown through
actual loss of revenues if you prove that there was some sort of
nexus there.88 This would be very, very difficult to do. Second,
the other way was through a carefully constructed consumer
survey, which would demonstrate not only a mental association,
but also that there was some sort of harm, some whittling-away of
the mark.89 Finally, you could use contextual factors, which I
consider the Polaroid factors,90 as long as there was some sort of
other proof.91 So, there had to be a complement to some other
proof.
But I think that this opens the door to other ways of proving
actual dilution. From what I understand, they really have not used
consumer surveys to show this because it is going to be very
difficult to show a whittling-away in the context of consumer
surveys.
People may want to use the testimonyand I think that it has
been done in at least in one caseof a marketing expert to show
there has been or will be a whittling-away of the uniqueness of the
mark if the junior user’s mark is allowed to continue even on noncompeting goods.92
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Okay. I think we’ll go directly to Sue
for, as I understand it, the “con” view on dilution.
MS. PROGOFF: Okay. I disagree with some of the things Ceil
said.
87
See id. (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460–65 (4th Cir. 1999)).
88
See id.
89
See id. at 427 n.6, 434 (citing Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464).
90
See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (listing
factors tending to show a likelihood: “the strength of [the plaintiff’s mark], the degree of
similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the
prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good
faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication
of the buyers.”).
91
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 427 n.6 (citing Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 457, 464–65).
92
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026
(9th Cir. 2004); Mark Bric Display Corp. v. Joseph Struhl Co., 2003 WL 21696318, at *7
(D.R.I. July 9, 2003); see also Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513,
1548 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff’d, 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1996).
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The federal dilution law, as it is currently written, really
doesn’t accomplish what it was intended to accomplish. Courts
have difficulty applying it. I think practitioners don’t really know
what they need to prove in order to prevail. What ended up
happening in many of the cases, where courts have granted an
injunction under the dilution statute,93 they also granted an
injunction under either section 43(a)94 or the trademark
infringement section of the Lanham Act.95 In other words, people
were still proving that there was a likelihood of confusion.
Because there has kind of been a blurring, if you’ll pardon the
term, between the infringement and unfair competition portions of
the statute and the dilution sections of the statute, it really has left
the law as kind of mishmash, where people don’t really know
where they stand.
Generally, if you are truly dealing with a famous trademark,
you can show that there is a likelihood of confusion in the way that
that term has been interpreted over the yearsin other words,
confusion as to source, confusion as to sponsorship, confusion as
to approval or endorsement. Additionally, the products do not
need to be closely related for that to happen. I think that the way
marketing has evolved since Frank Schechter wrote his article
makes it much easier for trademark owners to show there is a
likelihood of confusion.96
Let me just talk a little bit about how trademark usage has
changed. In the last twenty years or so, corporate licensing has
become a major factor in the trademark arena.97 Twenty years ago,
you only saw licensing of entertainment-type trademarks, sports
trademarks, and designer names; there really wasn’t much beyond
that. This has totally changed. Corporate licensing is now a
93

See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 [FTDA], Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat.
985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1) (2003)).
94
Lanham Act § 43(a).
95
Lanham Act § 32.
96
See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1029,
1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing some of the products Schechter utilized in his article).
97
See Allan Feldman, What Every Trademark Attorney Should Know About Business
Motivations, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 47, 47–48 (1996) (“Corporate trademark licensing . . .
has been moving from what was historically a marginal, ancillary activity to what is now
a mainstream corporate business tool.”).
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multibillion-dollar industry.98 I think that consumers have come to
understand that trademarks are not necessarily used only on the
core products but they also can be used on other products that are
extensions.
Let me give you some examples. In the old days, designer
trademarks were used primarily on clothing.99 Sometimes, you
would see them on shoes or handbags, but not much beyond that.
Today, you see designer names from the clothing field going over
into fragrances, cosmetics, towels, sheets, furniture, and other
kinds of household products.100 So, there is a broad array of things
that consumers have come to associate with the source of a
clothing product.
Think about a brand like Eddie Bauer. Eddie Bauer is
primarily a brand of clothing. It is also used as a service mark for
clothing stores and for a catalogue that sells primarily clothing.101
But it is also licensed as a trademark to be used on cars, on
SUVs.102 So, it has gone beyond the scope of what its core brand
is into something that is really totally unrelated.

98

See, e.g., Anjali Kapur, Government-Unique Marks: From Star Wars to Joint Strike
Fighters, 32 PUB. CONT. L. J. 141, 145–46 (2002). In 1997, lessors of intangible assets,
except copyrighted works, had an industry-wide annual sales volume of 11,263,865,000
according to the U.S. census. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1997 ECONOMIC CENSUS, available
at http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E533110.HTM (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
99
See generally Susan Heller Anderson, The Big Couture Rip-Off, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1981, § 6, at 62 (discussing the struggles of designer clothing companies such as
Christian Dior, Louis Vuitton, and Coco Chanel to protect their trademarks).
100
See generally Warren Berger, Licensing for Fun and Profit—and Free Exposure,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at F13 (describing the vast potential and profitability of
licensing of consumer products). For example, Giorgio Armani, traditionally a clothing
designer, offers a variety of products from fragrances to home décor. See Giorgio
Armani, at http://www.giorgioarmani.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
101
According to the Eddie Bauer Web site, “Eddie Bauer has become an international,
multi-channel company with catalogs, over 425 stores and an award-winning web site.”
Eddie Bauer, Company Background, at http://www.eddiebauer.com/about/company_info/company_background.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
102
Ford currently sells a model of its Explorer SUV under the Eddie Bauer name. See
Ford Explorer, Explorer Eddie Bauer, at http://www.fordvehicles.com/suvs/explorer/glance/index.asp#Explorer_Eddie_Bauer (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); see also
Greg Wilson, Test Drive: 2003 Ford Expedition Eddie Bauer, CanadianDriver, at
http://www.canadiandriver.com/testdrives/03expedition2.htm (Sept. 20, 2002).
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Think about Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola was one of the first brands
that was licensed from a corporate perspective to a whole line of
products.103 It started out as a soft drink.104 They opened up a
store where they had clothing, toys, bottle openers, and mouse
pads; you name it, they have a product with the Coke logo and the
Coca Cola trademark on it.105
Another example is Harley-Davidson, well known for
motorcycles. But the trademark is also used on restaurants and
clothing.106 Or even think about Buick, the classic example of why
we need dilution.107 I don’t know what Buick has done with their
trademark, but most car manufacturers now have huge licensing
programs.108 They send out catalogues. In the dealerships, they
have a store where they sell all kinds of things like clothing,
jewelry, and luggage, which are totally unrelated to cars, but have
the trademark on them.109
In view of that kind of environment, it’s not difficult if you
have a really famous trademark—which is what the dilution statute
is intended to protect—to show that if it’s used on an unrelated
103

Constance L. Hays, No More Brand X; Licensing of Names Adds to Image and
Profit, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at D1 (describing Cola-Cola as a “success story that
has touched off a thousand other licensing ventures”).
104
The Coca-Cola Company is “the world’s leading manufacturer, marketer, and
distributor of nonalcoholic beverage concentrates and syrups, used to produce nearly 400
beverage brands . . . in over 200 countries around the world.” Coca-Cola Company, at
http://www.coca-cola.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
105
Coca-Cola sells several of these products through its online store. See cocacolastore.com, at http://www.coca-colastore.com/b2c/process/Index.pasp (last visited
Mar. 31, 2004).
106
For an example of the various products Harley-Davidson offers, see HarleyDavidson USA at http://www.harley-davidson.com/pr/en/products.asp (last visited Mar.
31, 2004).
107
See Schechter, supra note 27, at 825 (setting forth the foundation of dilution law by
recognizing that trademarks could extend beyond indicators of the source of goods and
focusing on the value of the uniqueness of the trademark as free standing embodiments of
quality and value, worthy themselves of independent protection).
108
See Buick, Apparel & Accessories Collection, at http://www.buickattire.com/catalog/default.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) (offering Buick-marked goods unrelated to
its automobiles such as shirts, hats, and gym bags); see also Mercedez-Benz, The
Collection, at http://www.thecollection.mbusa.com/collection/templates/index.jsp (last
visited Apr. 7, 2004) (offering goods with the Mercedez-Benz trademark such as silver
ballpoint pens, women’s diamond watches, and leather briefcases).
109
See supra note 108.
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product, an appreciable number of consumers are likely to think
that there is some approval, affiliation, licensing relationship, or
some kind of connection. The product may not necessarily be
manufactured by the manufacturer of the core product, but it is at
least approved or licensed in some way.
That kind of proof will get you an injunction under either
section 43(a)110 or the trademark infringement provision111 of the
Lanham Act. In view of that, if the goal is to protect famous
trademarks, what the dilution statute was really enacted for, then it
is unnecessary.
When you fashion the argument in terms of likelihood of
confusion as to source or sponsorship or approval, it’s something
that courts are familiar with and know how to deal with. So, it
makes it a lot easier to frame an argument and present proof in a
way that a judge or jury will find understandable, and it’s more
likely to get you some relief.
I believe another problem with the federal dilution statute is the
wording of it because it’s not clear what is being protected. It talks
about “famous marks” and “distinctive marks,” but there is also a
list of factors that courts are supposed to consider to decide
whether a mark is distinctive.112 Many of them are also factors
110

Lanham Act § 43(a).
Lanham Act § 32.
112
FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§1125(c)(1) (2003)). The FTDA states:
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to—
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1).
111
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courts routinely consider in deciding whether there is a likelihood
of confusion, such as the trade channels that products are sold
through or the nature and extent of use by third parties.113 So, I
think that the statute is badly drafted.
Lastly, there is a tremendous amount of uncertainty as to what
needs to be proved. It’s very nice to say that you need to prove
actual dilution, but in the cases that have come down since
Moseley, which have been decided on the merits and in general and
where relief is granted under the dilution statute, there is also a
claim under some other provision in the Lanham Act.114 The
Lanham Act has provided a basis for relief through either section
43(a), a counterfeiting provision, the anti-cyber-squatting section
of the statute, or some other section. So, it’s not really a case
where the only issue has been blurring. I think courts have been
granting dilution injunctions since Moseley where there is blurring
plus something else close to a likelihood of confusion.115 To me,
that suggests that the dilution statute is really superfluous.
PROFESSOR BEEBE: We’ll open it up now for questions
about dilution or its history, or comments in favor or against
dilution. I thought I’d take advantage of my position as moderator
to ask the first question because I’m desperately curious about this.
What went wrong in the 1990s that led to the creation of the
FTDA, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, which was passed into
law in 1995?116 Most practitioners, even those who are in favor of
anti-dilution protection, feel as though the FTDA was a disaster in
one way or another.117 How did it go so poorly for the trademark
113

See 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1).
See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2003)
(claims of likelihood of confusion and dilution).
115
Cf. Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 892,
902 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (concluding that “[i]n view of the developing status of the law on
the nature of evidence required, the court believes that the best course is to permit the
plaintiff the opportunity to present its dilution claim to the jury”); Playtex Prods. v.
Georgia-Pacific Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1923 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2003) (refusing to
grant injunction in the absence of any likelihood of confusion).
116
FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
117
See Bassam N. Ibrahim & Bryce J. Maynard, Recent Supreme Court Opinion Rules
That the Federal Trademark Dilution Act “FTDA” Requires Proof of Actual Dilution,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Apr. 2003 (describing the surprise of many trademark veterans,
academics, and commentators to the Supreme Court’s decision).
114
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bar in the mid-1990s? What went wrong in Congress? Is there
any explanation for the language of the FTDA?
MS. DRISCOLL: I was involved in writing an amicus brief for
the International Trademark Association. We did a lot of research
into the legislative history, what happened and how it happened. I
have to tell you it is a total mystery.
Frankly, if there were a dilution statute, I would prefer one like
New York’s, which is two sentences long and allows judges to
interpret it under the principles of equity.118 That is how we got to
where we are from the 1905 Act, the general sort of adapting to
what is going on in the marketplace. We were unable to find out
just how this particular style of the statute evolved.
MS. DEMPSEY: I think that a lot of the trouble was also in
how the courts interpreted the statute.119 They were finding
dilution where there were not famous and distinctive trademarks.
And I think that when they started to get into niche markets, they
were again finding relief for marks that were not distinctive or
famous from the general public’s point of view.120 So, it was being
used in more of a haphazard way, depending on the court you were
in.
Whereas I think that if you really stick to the notion that the
FTDA is really intended to protect famous, distinctive trademarks
and protect the selling power that Frank Schechter talked about in
his article,121 it is important to have a manageable cause of action.
Sometimes the courts were thinking too much into this.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I have a slightly different view. I
think the motivation for the federal dilution law came at least in
part from international considerations. The United States was
seeking to get countries to protect famous marks under the TRIPS

118

See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-l (McKinney 2003).
See Ibrahim & Maynard, supra note 117 (summarizing the “long-standing split
between the United States Circuit Courts as to the level of proof necessary to succeed on
a claim under the FTDA”).
120
See, e.g., Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 380 (Or. 1983) (holding
that real estate developer’s “Wedgwood” trademark could be protected against dilution,
finding it to be “locally famous” while conceding that it lacked national fame).
121
See Schechter, supra note 27, at 831.
119
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Agreement.122 If you listen to intellectual property people from
abroad, and Asian countries in particular, you hear the complaint
that the United States is trying to force them through bilateral
agreements (often today called Free Trade Agreements) to enact
high IP protection provisions that the United States, itself, does not
have. Many countries, especially those from the civil law
tradition, expect to see explicit protection in national laws. For
protection of famous marks, the answer to these countries that in
the United States you have to look at scattered state laws and case
law requiring that marks be strong to be protected is certainly not
as persuasive as “Look, we have a federal statute that does exactly
what we are asking you to do.” Therefore, the federal dilution bill,
whose origins were domestic, was perfect to meet this international
need. It had already been through legislative consideration in an
earlier form. It said “famous” in it. It was literally a bill that fit
the bill.123
Thus, while domestic considerations—a perceived need for
federal dilution protection—was the reason the original bill was
drafted and introduced, I think that at least one factor that caused
action and passage of the bill at that time was international in
character.
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Yes?
QUESTIONER: I have a question about confusion, about the
difference between likelihood of dilution and actual dilution. If
you have to prove actual dilution under the FTDA and likelihood is
not sufficient, and if the mere fact that a consumer mentally
associates the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not
sufficient to establish actual dilution, and if blurring is not a
necessary consequence of mental association or tarnishing, what
act would prove actual dilution? Would you have to show by
survey or by a preponderance of persons in a survey that, in this
case, they associated the tawdry goods shop with the Victoria’s
Secret shop, when here they’re saying that blurring is not of
122

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994).
123
See 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1); see supra note 112.
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consequence nor is tarnishing necessary to prove actual dilution?
So, what would constitute it?
MS. DRISCOLL: Well, the Supreme Court actually gave a
couple of suggestions. There was an expert that Victoria’s Secret
retained, who testified generally about Victoria’s Secret’s business,
the catalogues, the impact, and so forth.124 The Court, however,
explained that the expert had nothing to say about the impact of the
petitioner’s name on the strength of the respondent’s mark.125 I
take that as a suggestion that in the future you are going to have
marketing experts who are, under one theory or another, going to
be testifying as to what the impact on the strength of the mark was
through the adverse use. I haven’t seen that yet in the cases, but
there is a clear indication here that the Court is going to give us
something.
Second, consumer surveys can show actual dilution. That was
tried in a case involving Toucan Sam, who I gather is a Kellogg
character.126 It is not famous enough to have reached me, but I
gather it is children’s cereal or something.
MS. PROGOFF: Froot Loops.
MS. DRISCOLL: Okay. I didn’t know Froot Loops.
Anyway, that is one of the cases where there were surveys that
tried to show a mark that had X fame or recognition before the
defendant started using a toucanin this case it was on a golf
cluband that the recognition afterwards was not as high.127
The only reason, I gather, that Kellogg had a survey was
because it is in the kind of company that does marketing surveys
all the time.128 Obviously companies cannot go around measuring

124

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 424 (2003).
Id. at 419.
126
Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003).
127
Id. at 628 (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ use of their toucan trademarks
had caused the lessoning of the capacity of consumers to distinguish the goods offered by
Kellogg).
128
See id. at 624 (noting that Kellogg has expended a “massive amount of time, money,
and effort” in marketing Froot Loops); see also Michael Hess & Robert Mayer, Integrate
Behavioral and Survey Research, MARKETING NEWS (Jan. 3, 2000) (explaining that
Kellogg’s researchers are “trained to have both survey research skills and syndicated125
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the strength of their mark in case somebody infringes it tomorrow
and then measure it again. I mean, that gets to be crazy.
In that case, the court held that you can’t prove that there was
an effect merely because in the beginning Kellogg showed that X
number of children recognized Toucan Sam as the spokesbird for
Froot Loops.129 After the defendant started, they did the same kind
of recognition surveythis time it happened to be among adults
since they would be using the golf clubsand the recognition
factor was not that much different.130 So, Kellogg’s attempt didn’t
work.131 But that would be another way to do it—showing that the
mark no longer means just Froot Loops or just a cereal.
In the Moseley case, the Department of Justice filed an amicus
brief suggesting ways to prove actual dilution through surveys.132
It had the idea that a trademark signifies not just source but a group
of indicia that consumers have come to associate with the product
on which it is used.133 For example, Gerber on baby food means
it’s good and wholesome.134 If somebody started using Gerber on
some other totally different product with different characteristics,
the government felt that you could show dilution by finding that
people had different ideas about the characteristics of the product
after the defendant started its use.135 They didn’t say “wholesome,
good tasting” anymore. They added something else that wouldn’t
necessarily be a good thing for baby food. It no longer meant the

research skills”), available at http://www.promotiondecisions.com/articles/mktgnews/intrsrch.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
129
Kellogg Co., 337 F.3d at 624 (citing survey information “indicating that 94% of
Americans recognize Toucan Sam, and 81% of children who recognize him correspond
him with Froot Loops”).
130
Id. at 628 (relying on customer surveys that showed no difference in consumer
recognition of plaintiffs’ marks, both before and after the defendants’ use of the toucan
mark on unrelated goods).
131
Id. at 627 (“Kellogg has presented no evidence of actual customer confusion.”).
132
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in Part at 7–
8, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015).
133
See id. at 10.
134
See id.
135
See id. (explaining that a trademark “seeks to assure a potential customer that a
product with a particular mark is made by the same producer as other similarly marked
items”).
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indicia that surrounded the baby food; it meant something else as
well. But these are awfully difficult things to prove.
QUESTIONER: Would part of that require that people who
were surveyed before and after to prove the dilution of the mark be
the same? Because I could see a situation, for example, in which
Gerber as being good for baby food, if the group surveyed were
young mothers, would see it one way; meanwhile, if Gerber was
suddenly adopted as a mark for a new brand of insecticide, and you
were to go to industrial professional pesticide appliers, they would
recognize Gerber as the world’s leading bug killer. If I were to ask
prior, “What does Gerber mean?” and I ask only young mothers
and they say “baby food,” and then six months later, after Gerber
comes out on the insecticide, I go only to pesticide appliers and
say, “What do you associate with Gerber?” and they say “the
world’s best pesticide,” that could be two disparate decisions and
could lead to even more confusion if a court were to accept that
type of evidence.
MS. DRISCOLL: I agree. The universe is a problem, as it is in
all of these cases. In the cases that have been decided since
Moseley, these kinds of things that have been accepted as evidence
of actual dilution.
In one case, someone used the trademark in its domain name,
and the plaintiff basically said, “Because of that, my mark can’t be
exploited because I can’t use it in a domain name and therefore
attract new customers, so you’ve lessened the value of the
trademark because I can’t use a certain kind of marketing
technique I otherwise could have.”136
In another case, it was a counterfeit case, and that seems to me
to be easyI mean, it obviously has affected everything about the
plaintiff’s business.137
In a third case, the Four Seasons Hotel had cut off a licensee,
and the licensee continued to use the mark.138 As Susan said,
obviously you’ve got likelihood of confusion there. But the court
136

Cf. Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
Cf. Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
138
Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
137
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also held there was dilution, and it found actual harm to the
trademark because a customer had written to Four Seasons to
complain about the quality of the services at the defendant’s
hotel.139
I mean, these are things that are not strict dilution kinds of
concepts. So, the courts are trying to get away from the difficulty
Moseley is presenting by looking at concepts that really aren’t
dilution concepts and finding actual dilution.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: We should keep in mind that the
Supreme Court in Moseley made it fairly clear that if the junior
user uses the identical name, not just a similar name, that actual
dilution could be demonstrated simply by the junior user’s use of
the name.140 In the Gerber example, for instance, that would mean
there would be actual dilution. The problematical cases are those
where the two marks are not identical. Then the question is how
far away from identical are the marks? The further away the more
problematical, and in Moseley they were quite different. I think
trademark owners should make more of that identical-mark dicta in
Justice Stevens’ opinion. One can hear whole discussions of
Moseley by trademark attorneys with no mention of it.
What is quite amazing is that Victoria’s Secret counsel, Walter
Dellinger, volunteered during oral argument that the junior’s use of
the name is not enough for dilution (after conceding that the
likelihood of confusion standard was not appropriate under the
FTDA).141 So, both parties before the Court and the Department of
Justice as an amicus all agreed that just use would not be enough to
139

Id. at 1320–21.
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432–33 (“At least where the marks are not identical . . . the
mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is
not sufficient to establish actionable dilution.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 434 (“It
may well be, however, that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not
be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence—
the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical.”) (emphasis
added).
141
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (No. 01-1015)
(argued Nov. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Moseley Oral Argument] (“QUESTION: Is
likelihood of dilution enough? MR. DELLINGER: No, not under the act and—and nor is
just using the name enough . . . .”), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2004).
140
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prove actual dilution. The fact that the Court under those
circumstances sua sponte then put in the qualification on their own
really showed how supportive the Court was of traditional dilution
protection.
I agree with Marie that an expert saying “there is dilution here”
is going to be probably more than enough for most courts to find
dilution. I don’t think these cases are really decided on courts
finding some sort of dilution, or even likelihood of confusion.
They mostly figure it out “good guy, bad guy.” Is someone free
riding? Is someone taking advantage? If they do, they’ll say
whatever they have to say.
Take the Stork Club case in 1948.142 Here, there was obviously
no confusion, yet the Court found confusion.143 Why? Because
the defendant was taking advantage of someone else’s goodwill,
and if allowed to happen it would result in the dilution of the Stork
Club mark and logo.144 The real key to winning a trademark case
is to establish that you are the good guy, that the defendant is
trying to do something with your goodwill without your
permission, and that it is harmful to your mark. If you get that
point across, you are going to win in ninety-nine percent of the
cases.
Today, the real problem for trademark owners in dilution
actions is the innocent infringer. The person who has never heard
of younot likely with a famous markbut this entity by
definition is not a bad guy. In this situation, courts tend to look to
the doctrine and carefully apply the tests. The dicta in Moseley
about identical names and actual dilution become very important.
In any case, innocent infringers are rare, usually are very small,

142

Stork Rest. Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948).
See id. at 358–59.
144
See id. at 356. The case was brought under California Unfair Competition Law
because “The Stork Club” was then considered only a trade name. Today, it would be a
common law trademark. In any case, the Ninth Circuit noted that as a trade name it
would receive the same protection as a trademark and, as noted above, found likelihood
of confusion. See id. at 352. The court also noted that unfair competition law was
broader in reach than trademark law, but its conclusions as to confusion as to source
supported traditional trademark infringement as well. Today, there is no real difference
between the reach of trademark law and unfair competition law.
143
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and are not going to have the financial wherewithal to be able to
litigate very far into the case.
There are legitimate complaints about some of the dilution
cases. One reason is that the law has been applied as a catch-all
for courts to get the bad guy, and this results in stretching dilution
doctrine. An example is in the broad application of tarnishment
concept as demonstrated in Moseley. A mark’s representation of
quality only can be tarnished if the junior user’s mark is identical
or very similar. The same is true for the type of “whittling away”
dilution that Frank Schechter envisioned in his 1927 article.145
This point was that with the same mark on products or services
from different sources the public will now be aware that there are
different sources for goods with the mark. The senior user’s mark
then becomes less “distinctive” because its signal to the public that
the senior user is the sole source of any product with that mark is
destroyed. (“Distinctive” is just a term of art meaning “whether
the design, [name, etc. is] likely to be understood as an indicator of
the product’s source.)146
There are costs to the consumer as well. When two different
producers use the same mark, even when there is no confusion, it
increases search costs because now consumers are going to have to
find out which of two or more producers is selling the product. So,
there are problems for the consumer, and there are problems for the
brand owner.
This scenario never happened nor was even threatened in the
Moseley case. No one looked at Victor’s Little Secret and said,
145

See supra note 27.
See, e.g., Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 378 (2d
Cir.1997) (citing Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1008 (2d Cir.1995)).
Thus, a “famous” mark, of necessity, would be distinctive. After the Symposium,
Professor Hansen noted that Judge Leval of the Second Circuit, normally very astute in
intellectual property law, stated that a mark could be famous and not distinctive. See
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999). Professor Hansen
further remarked that Judge Leval did not seem to realize that distinctiveness does not
have the lay definition, but is a term of art for indication of source or origin and that this
may explain his other “ridiculous conclusion that only inherently distinctive marks are
subject to dilution protection.” See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc.,
244 F. 3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2001). Judge Leval’s rule would mean one of the most famous
marks in the world, Coca Cola, a descriptive mark with secondary meaning, would
receive no protection against dilution.
146
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“Oh my, there are now two different sources of goods using the
same name.” Victor’s Little Secret would never dilute Victoria’s
Secret in the sense of making it less distinctive. It was a play on
words that would cause people to associate the two names, but not
in the sense that they would now not know which was the source
of goods in the future.
For the district court in Moseley, Victor Moseley was a bad
guy. First, he lied about how he chose the name, and then he lied
about not knowing of the Victoria’s Secret brand.147 He was
“going down” no matter what. The district court found dilution as
a matter of law denying Moseley a trial on that issue.148 Summary
judgment for the plaintiff in a trademark action of any kind is
extraordinarily rare, and even more peculiar here where Victoria’s
Secret did not have a strong dilution case to begin with.
Now what did the Supreme Court do? Did it find that dilution
could be not be proven as a matter of law and dismiss the
complaint? No, it simply remanded the case back to the district
court.149 In case anyone reading the case did not understand what
that meant, Justice Kennedy in his concurrence stated that the
“Court’s opinion does not foreclose injunctive relief if respondents
on remand present sufficient evidence of either blurring or
tarnishment.” 150 In short, Victoria’s Secret would start over with
the right to prove dilution or tarnishment or both. Moseley, after
litigating through three levels of federal courts, would have to start
over from the beginning before a hostile district court judge.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy made clear to the district court and
others that equity seeks to prevent harm and that a mark owner to
obtain preliminary relief should not have to prove that harm
already occurred.151 This, of course, provides a backdoor way to

147

See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1092 (W.D. Ky. Feb.
9, 2000) (“The Moseleys assert that their selection of ‘Victor’s Secret’ for the name of
their store was a complete coincidence. They claim that they had never seen a Victoria’s
Secret catalogue or a Victoria’s Secret advertisement prior to opening their store.”), aff’d,
259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d and remanded, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
148
Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095–96.
149
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
150
See id. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151
See id. at 435–36 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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retain the “likelihood of dilution” standard for preliminary
injunctions.
I do not think that in these “bad guy” cases, much evidence
will be needed. Justice Stevens, in the opinion of the Court, was
very helpful to district courts wanting to find dilution when he
stated that in Moseley there had been a complete lack of evidence
of dilution.152 Plaintiff’s production of some evidence, therefore,
could be enough for a court so inclined to distinguish Moseley.
Certainly an expert who says that there has or will be dilution
would be enough. The courts who want to distinguish Moseley
case are going to find ways to do so fairly easily. The key for
trademark owners is to demonstrate as a policy matter why they
should distinguish Moseley.
MS. DEMPSEY: I think the Toucan Sam case, though, was
one where there was probably a little bit of overreaching on the
part of Kellogg.153 I think there was some sort of overreaching on
the part of Kellogg because the bird in that case was very different
from the Toucan Sam that we know from Froot Loops.154 In fact,
the court found that there was, first of all, no likelihood of
confusion even though Kellogg had used a Toucan Sam on golf
balls in a 1982 commercial.155 Where Toucan Sam was shown
playing golf, there really wasn’t an association with golf; the Court
found that people didn’t think of Toucan Sam as a golfer.156
And then they went to the dilution theory and found that they
hadn’t proved actual dilution.157 I think a lot of it had to do with
the fact that the marks in that case were very, very different marks,
that it wasn’t a personalized kind of toucan that was being used on
the golf equipment that defendants had sold.158

152

See id. at 434 (“There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the
capacity of the Victoria’s Secret mark.”).
153
Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003).
154
Id. at 622.
155
Id. at 624–25.
156
See id. at 625.
157
Id. at 628.
158
See id. at 616.

2 PANEL I FORMAT

878

8/6/2004 2:57 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 14:849

And it was really just a husband-and-wife outfit in that case.159
So, maybe that lends support to what you are saying.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes.
MS. DEMPSEY: But I think also in that case it shows that you
may have a case where you need a cause of action for dilution. It
was probably more a dilution cause of action than a likelihood of
confusion cause of action. But I believe the court was right in not
finding either likelihood of confusion or dilution in that case.160
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think one problem is that some
trademark owners tend to overreach.
MS. DEMPSEY: I don’t know if I would agree with that.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Present company excluded, of
course. But we do have some overbroad efforts by some
trademark owners to stop the use of their marks.
Overall it is important to keep in mind that courts in the United
States provide the strongest protection in the world for trademarks.
Regardless of doctrine, U.S. courts generally treat the goodwill in a
trademark as a type of property interest. If someone borrows or
uses the goodwill in another’s mark for commercial advantage and
without payment or authorization, courts generally will find a way
to stop it.
MS. PROGOFF: I think, consistent with what Hugh was just
saying, some of the very early dilution cases after the federal
statute was enacted were brought by people who really knew that
they couldn’t prove a likelihood of confusion, so they brought a
claim under the dilution statute instead.161 In most of those cases
the plaintiffs lost. I think courts were very unhappy with the
statute. That was kind of their first introduction to it—a lot of
cases that really had no merit, but people were using it as a way to
159

Id. at 621.
See id. at 627–29.
161
See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc. 939 F. Supp. 340, 350
(D.N.J. 1996) (that plaintiff’s mark was “not famous and unworthy of protection under
the new federal law”); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp.
1559, 1574 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that “the First Amendment would apply to this use
of the trademarks at issue, and that as an expressive use, this use [was] exempt from the
reach of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act”).
160
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get into court when they knew they didn’t have enough evidence to
show likelihood of confusion.162
QUESTIONER: Susan, I’m curious about something that you
said. I’m trying to figure out whether you think this is a good or
bad idea. When you talked about people having licensing
programs and the fact that there’s a lot of money in that, it sounded
like you were saying, “And oh, by the way, that could help you if
somebody plunked your name on some unrelated goods because in
fact you are licensing people to do that as well.”
By the same token, it could be a very bad idea because it puts a
burden on the license holders to monitor the quality of the things
that carry their name. At the same time actual dilution may be
more difficult to prove, because, by allowing people to put your
name on cars or whatever, you are diluting your own mark.
MS. PROGOFF: There has been a lot of discussion about
whether licensing is self-dilution.163 If you go back to what a
trademark really is, it is supposed to be a symbol of a certain level
of quality, whether the trademark is good, bad, medium, or
whatever it is.164 The theory behind licensing is that whatever type
of product you see attached to a trademark on should be a
consistent level of quality with the core products.165 They can be
mid-market, high-market, low-market, whatever is appropriate.
I’m not advocating a licensing program. I think there are good
reasons why trademark owners engage in licensing programs. It is
certainly something that can build a brand, but I wouldn’t do it
simply to create a claim for dilution.

162

See Dr. Seuss Enters., 924 F. Supp. at 1573 (stating that a claim for dilution does not
require a showing of a likelihood of confusion).
163
See, e.g., Michael Anthony Arciero, The Growing Risk of Self-Dilution, 12 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 213 (2001); Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year
2000, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 729 (2000); Elizabeth C. Bannon, The Growing Risk of SelfDilution, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 570 (1992).
164
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 3:10 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MCCARTHY] (stating that the concept of
trademarks as an indicator of a level of consistent quality emerged in the 1930s).
165
Pamela S. Chestek, Control of Trademarks by the Intellectual Property Holding
Company, 41 IDEA 1, 26–27 (2001); see also Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and
Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979).
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What I was saying is that because there has been so much
licensing over the last ten or fifteen years, consumers have come to
expect that when a well-known trademark appears on something
that is unrelated to the core product, that it is probably authorized
or licensed. That was really my point.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I’ve heard the argument a number of
times that use of a mark on a number of products causes dilution.
But this is not dilution. Dilution has two qualities. One, as Sue
was saying, is a quality thing; but the other is as a source, meaning
it comes from one sourceit can be five products coming from
one source, but it’s still one source. Dilution results not from a
number of different products with the mark of one manufacturer,
but rather from a number of different sources of products with the
same mark.
From a marketing point of view, there was the concept that it
was ill- advised to sell different products with the same mark. It
“diluted” the brand’s strength, in a lay sense, to put it on different
products. So, Coke, for a long time the marketing people at Coke
would not allow anything but the cola drink to use the mark. It
used Tab for a diet cola, for instance.166 The view was that Diet
Coke would dilute Coke in terms of the commercial impression of
what Coke means to the consumer. But that’s a marketing concept,
not a source-of-origin legal concept—and thus, not a dilution
concept as we use it.
Everyone knows Diet Coke comes from the same source as
Coke. It has not diluted the distinctiveness of Coke to have Diet
Coke or Diet Vanilla Cokewhich is my favorite, by the wayor
even Diet Lemon Coke, which is pretty good also. And no one
says, “Oh my heavens, you know what? A lot of different people
are using Coke now!” No. It’s Coke using the Coke mark on a
number of different products.167

166

Coca-Cola did not expand its product line for seventy-five years until it introduced
Sprite in 1961, Tab in 1963, and Fresca in 1966. See Coca-Cola, 1990–Now, available at
http://heritage.coca-cola.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
167
According to the Coca-Cola Web site, Coca-Cola produces nearly 400 beverage
brands. See Coca-Cola, at http://www2.coca-cola.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
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PROFESSOR BEEBE: Hugh, I was wondering about
something you said earlier, which is basically that dilution is
misappropriation action, or a misappropriation of goodwill, and
there are a lot of equity judgments on the part of the court, which
consist of good guy and bad guy. I’m unclear if this is a good
thing or a bad thing in your view?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think it would take too long to
answer that here in the dilution panel, but my short answer is that
courts are right in protecting the goodwill a mark owner has built
up from use by others without authorization for commercial
purposes. It goes back to how you view basic misappropriation
principles—is it wrong to “reap where you have not sown.” I
generally agree that such reaping or free riding should be
discouraged.
And that’s what the courts have done. For instance, in Europe
in what they call the “badge of allegiance” cases, U.S. courts are
highly protective. They stop unauthorized sellers of tee-shirts,
uniform jerseys, etc. with sports team names or individual players’
names on them.168 No consumer views the name on the shirt as
necessarily indicating the source of the shirt. For that one looks at
the label in the back or the hang tag. The reason courts stop
unauthorized sellers is because they are using someone else’s
goodwill. The unauthorized sellers buy a tee-shirt for $2.00 and
are selling it for $20.00. They are selling $18.00 of goodwill that
they didn’t create or pay for.
In fact, courts will stop uses of another’s goodwill that are less
blatant and more subtle as evidenced in the initial confusion or
foot-in-the-door cases such as Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus
Petroleum Corp.169 There, a company in the oil business called
itself Pegasus, which in Greek mythology was the flying horse.
For many years, Mobil Oil used a representation of that flying
horse as a mark. The defendant did not use a picture of the flying
horse, but only the name for it, which Mobil did not use.170 In its
168

See Lucas G. Paglia & Mark A. Rush, End Game: The Ex Parte Seizure Process and
the Battle Against Bootleggers, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 4, 8 (2002) (discussing
likelihood of confusion in the context of bootlegging).
169
818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
170
See id. at 256.
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telephone solicitations the use of “Pegasus” was enough to get the
other party to listen and not hang up thinking defendant might be
affiliated in some way with Mobil Oil.171 Ultimately, the lack of
affiliation was revealed, and there was no confusion from that
point on.172 Nevertheless, the fact that Pegasus was able to get its
foot in the door more readily because of the possible affiliation
with Mobil was enough use of Mobil’s goodwill to constitute a
trademark law violation.173
A similar case was the proposed use of “McSleep” by Quality
Inn, which upset McDonald’s.174 By the time someone actually
drove up the driveway, they would know it’s not owned or
affiliated with McDonald’s.175 What was Quality Inn doing? It
was using something, the Mc—— naming scheme that defined
McDonald’s family of marks, without payment or authorization.
Moreover, the chief executive of Quality Inn claimed that he had
not seen the McDonald’s connection despite much evidence to the
contrary.176 While a disclaimer would have protected McDonald’s
completely from confusion, it would not have prevented the
borrowing of its goodwill by Quality Inn. Thus, it was enjoined.
Moseley, in fact, was more in this category than a dilution case.
The real crime was using the goodwill in some way for Moseley’s
commercial advantage without payment or authorization. There
was no confusion and really no dilution, but Moseley borrowed or
alluded to Victoria’s Secret in its name and that was enough, at
least when coupled with the sleaze factor in the case. The district
court and the court of appeals found dilution as a matter of law
granting summary judgment in a problematical dilution case. And
then, in the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, who is the most antiintellectual property justice on the Court, wrote a very measured,
muted opinion in which he does not adopt any of the Fourth
Circuit’s anti-dilution law rhetoric.177 He noted (1) that “Victoria’s
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

See id. at 259.
See id.
Id.
Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
Id. at 220.
Id.
See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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Secret mark is unquestionably valuable;”178 (2) that Moseley did
not challenge the fact that Victoria’s Secret is a famous mark;179
and (3) that there was no contention “that the statutory protection
is confined to identical uses of famous marks, or that the statute
should be construed more narrowly in a case such as this
[Victoria’s Secret/Victor’s Little Secret].180 These are all positive
statements that support dilution protection.
Moreover, the Court only remanded the case for further
proceedings.181 That was not a win for Moseley nor a statement
that dilution could not be proved after factual hearing either with
regard to a preliminary injunction or a trial.
The way
commentators speak of the case is that the Court rejected
completely the dilution claims. They only found that the record on
the summary judgment motion did not support a finding of
dilution.
So, Moseley is much less of a problem for trademark owners
than many trademark lawyers have claimed. I think if most
trademark owners pick the right cases and put in an expert, they
are going to be okay in dilution cases.
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Actually, why don’t we move on now
to Hugh on the future of protection against dilution. Then we can
follow up with some more questions.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think I might have already made all
of my points. I will summarize, though.
First, it is important to keep in mind that there are still state
laws which only require a strong mark and the likelihood of
dilution.
Second, Justice Stevens’ opinion, as discussed, is actually more
narrow than is commonly perceived.
Third, also as discussed, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is very
helpful to trademark owners, and that, of course, is what he wanted

178
179
180
181

Id. at 432.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 434.
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to accomplish.182 His opinion is something trademark owners can
cite to district courts to make them more comfortable with finding
dilution and tarnishment, particularly in the preliminary injunction
context.
Fourth, I think Supreme Court opinions in intellectual property
cases historically have had little impact upon what happens in the
day-to-day litigation in the district courts and courts of appeals.
This is true for a number of reasons but that is a whole article by
itself.
Finally, Moseley has presented trademark owners with a good
reason to urge Congress to revise the FTDA, particularly to change
the dilution standard to “likelihood of dilution.” Congress has
been supportive in the past and could easily see the need to do
something in light of Moseley.
MS. DEMPSEY: I think there will be a period where
trademark owners will look at the post-Moseley cases to determine
whether they are getting the protection they want or need under
circumstantial evidence for the famous and distinctive marks.
Here, to the extent that marks are the same, maybe the testimony of
marketing experts can be used to show actual dilution.
If the courts protect the marks and trademark owners feel that
they are getting the protection they need, there probably won’t be
any kind of amendment to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. To
the extent that there isn’t, I think maybe there will be an impetus
on the part of trademark owners to introduce new legislation. I
know that the International Trade Association already has come up
with two different amendments to the dilution act.183 Then there
would be a real impetus to have Congress act and make
amendments to the dilution act.
MS. DRISCOLL: Can I ask you, Hugh, what you think of the
remarks by the Supreme Court on tarnishment? It says, whether
tarnishment is actually embraced by the statutory text is another
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Id. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See, e.g., FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2003)).
183
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matter.184 The Court continues, “Indeed, the contrast between the
state statutes, which expressly refer to both ‘injury to business
reputation’ and to ‘dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade
name or trademark,’ and the federal statute which refers only to the
latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the FTDA.”185
This suggests that there is no tarnishment claim under FTDA as
it is presently written. Of course, tarnishment was one of the key
things that dilution used to protect under state law.186
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes.
I think Stevens says
“arguably.” Moreover, Scalia made the point at oral argument.187
But note that the remand does not attempt to rule out any dilution
argument including tarnishment below, and Kennedy in his
concurrence explicitly states that on remand that plaintiffs are
entitled to injunctive relief if they prove tarnishment.188 Moreover,
counsel for Moseley agreed in oral argument that the FTDA action
allows a tarnishment claim.189
Stevens states that “[m]ental association does not establish
tarnishment.”190
Of course, that’s just a truism, and not
problematical. He mentions that the military officer made a mental
association, “but did not therefore form any different impression of
the store that his wife and daughter had patronized.”191 He doesn’t
say whether that comment is meant to apply to the tarnishment
184

See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432 (“Petitioners have not disputed the relevance of
tarnishment, presumably because that concept was prominent in litigation brought under
state antidilution statutes and because it was mentioned in the legislative history.
Whether it is actually embraced by the statutory text, however, is another matter.”)
(citation omitted).
185
Id.
186
See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 164, § 24:104.
187
See Moseley Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 5 (“[The] words of the statute refer
to distinctiveness of a mark. They don’t refer to tarnishment.”); see also id. at 46 (“[The
statutory definition of dilution] does not at all cover disparaging the other product.”).
188
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Court’s opinion does not
foreclose injunctive relief if respondents on remand present sufficient evidence of either
blurring or tarnishment.”).
189
See Moseley Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 17 (“QUESTION: . . . [Y]ou do not
contest that tarnishment is a—basis for the respondent to prevail in this case? MR.
HIGGINS: We do not.”).
190
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
191
Id. at 435.
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argument, although I think that is what he is talking about. Of
course, there was no preliminary injunction hearing or trial below
and the facts were not fully explored.
But that being said I do not think there was tarnishment in the
dilution sense in this case. No one was going to think that the
quality of what Victoria’s Secret mark stands for as a result of
Victor’s Little Secret means anything less because the association
between the two names was not of the type that exists in a dilution
case. So, I certainly cannot find fault with what the Court did by
saying that tarnishment was not proved as a matter of law.
Nor do I have any trouble as a theoretical matter with Scalia’s
recurring point of view that if Congress wants something in the
law it should clearly put it into the statute; that language in
committee reports does not substitute for language in the statute.192
When Congress does not put something clearly in the statute, his
view is that courts should not place it there. Here, it was probably
the intent of Congress to include those claims that were available
under state dilution law, but they did not make that explicit. The
problem with Scalia’s view is that as a practical matter it often
would produce results at odds with congressional intent, and
Congress would not be able to move the legislative machinery in a
way to correct statutory language in the many instances that would
result from Scalia’s approach.
But you certainly have tarnishment in state law, don’t you?
MS. DRISCOLL: Some states.
MS. PROGOFF: I think a lot of the cases that have involved
tarnishment have been decided under state dilution statutes. A lot
of them come down as parody cases. If the judge thinks it’s funny,
then usually there is no injunction. If the judge is offended in
some way, then there is. But I think most of those cases have been

192

Moseley Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 46 (“QUESTION: Nothing could be
clearer than that Congress adopted a definition . . . that does not at all cover disparaging
the other product. MR. DELLINGER: Well, it—Congress thought otherwise. The
House report say that the definition— QUESTION: The House committee thought
otherwise. MR. DELLINGER: Yes. QUESTION: What Congress thought was the
definition [in the statute] that Congress adopted.”).
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decided under the state statutes, and it remains to be seen what will
happen with them now.
MS. DRISCOLL: We have one case that a friend of mine sent
me that was decided in the district court in Illinois last week, in
which the court held that Moseley “discussed only blurring,
although it did leave open the question of whether tarnishment is
within the scope of § 43(c).”193 The court then raised the issue of
whether actual dilution would have to be shown for tarnishment
cases if in fact tarnishment cases were still covered under the
statute.194 So, it’s obvious that courts are having a little bit of
difficulty figuring out what law they are supposed to apply under
the federal statute.
In that case, by the way, the plaintiff didn’t get anyplace on its
motion for a temporary restraining order.195 It involved Caterpillar
Tractor.196 Caterpillar Tractor sued Walt Disney because the
villains were driving Caterpillar tractors in a TV program for
children.197 The allegation was on the tarnishment issue because
those children are never going to think of Caterpillar tractors as
good things anymore as a result of the tractors being driven by the
villains.198
PROFESSOR BEEBE: That raises an issue that I’m desperate
to introduce, even at this late time, into the conversation. That is,
what about the First Amendment side of dilution protection and the
limitations on expression?199 I mean, if it is true that judges are
just ruling on sort of off-the-cuff misappropriation basis“who’s
the good guy, who’s the bad guy?”that is sort of circular in a
sense. I mean, you are calling them a bad guy because they are
breaking the law, but you are saying they are breaking the law
because they are a bad guy. Where is the law on this issue?

193

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (citing
Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (2003)).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 916.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 918.
198
Id.
199
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Okay, maybe in the commercial context we can figure it out on
efficiency concerns. But in the First Amendment or expression
context, it is terrifying that these companies can claim tarnishment
and limit parodies of their products, in addition to limiting the uses
of their products in political speech.
Dilution seems to be expanding in scope enormously both in its
subject matter and in the scope of protection it provides. What is
the implication then for free speech, or how can it be defended on
those grounds? What comments, if any, do you have on that issue?
MS. DRISCOLL: You know, I think the parody takes care of
that. It has been my perceptionI don’t know what other people
thinkthat recently courts have been more likely to find parody
and no injury to the trademark owner than they used to be. They
are saying, “Come on, do you have a sense of humor?” or “Please,
this isn’t really affecting you, it’s obvious parodying.” I think the
cases are going more and more to the First Amendment side of the
balance.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Well, I don’t know. The Deere case
in the Second Circuit seemed to present facts that implicated the
First Amendment.200 Judge Jon Newman nevertheless found
tarnishment in a comparative ad that could be construed as a
parody without even discussing the First Amendment.201
Ironically, Newman would be exactly the type of judge you would
expect to consider the First Amendment, and he did not. The fact
that it was a comparative ad meant to gain a competitive
commercial advantage against John Deere probably made the
difference, although I do not think it should have.202
On the First Amendment question there is one case that is
incredibly overbroad and problematical. In World Wrestling
Federation Entertainment, Inc. v. Bozel,203 defendants blamed
plaintiff, World Wrestling Federation, for the deaths of four
children, calling the plaintiffs “criminal” and “evil.”204 The court
200
201
202
203
204

Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
See id. at 45
See id. at 41.
142 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
See id. at 528.
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held that these actions fell within a claim for dilution for
tarnishment.205 The defendants were not in business and did not
produce any product. This was a perfect vehicle to discuss the role
of the First Amendment in dilution and tarnishment claims, and
there was none.
So, I agree that the First Amendment should play a bigger role.
Unfortunately, when judges and juries look at these cases they do
not appear to have any thought of the First Amendment. They
seem to just look at the two parties, figure out if somebody is
hurting someone else, and determine what should be done about it.
Justice Breyer raised First Amendment issues at oral argument, but
the counsel for Moseley surprisingly deflected the helpful question
with the statement that “there really isn’t a public interest that is
being expressed or applied here.”206 Likewise, there was little
interest in this issue from the other justices.
And this type of approach is not limited to trademark law
where it could be argued that the First Amendment issues are
tangential. In defamation cases, where the First Amendment
provides tremendous protection for defendants, the defendants
nevertheless often lose at the trial level. The judge or jury see a
plaintiff harmed through very hurtful remarks that are normally
untrue. On the other hand, they see defendants, perhaps elitist,
lazy, negligent, arrogant, or all four, relying upon the doctrinal
defense of a lack of a demonstration of malice. Yet, where no
malice has been demonstrated, do the defendants then win? No,
they often lose at the trial level because they were the bad guys. If
you are representing media defendants, you really must create your
record for the appellate courts because you often will need them to
apply the defamation law in the way it was intended. I think it is
the same in dilution cases such as Moseley where the defendant is
viewed as a bad guy by the lower courts.
As to parody, what I think it comes down to is if the court likes
the parody, then it’s protected; if it doesn’t like the parody, then it
is not protected; and if it is pornographic, at least up until now, it
won’t like it. This may change in more “enlightened” days. I
205
206

See id. at 529.
See Moseley Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 18.
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don’t know if we will have more enlightened days, and I don’t
know if it would change even then.
But in analyzing Moseley, it is good to consider what if there
had not been pornographic movies, sex toys, and related “adult”
items in the back of Victor’s Little Secret—would Victor Moseley
have lost below? If the head of JAG at Fort Knox had not been
“personally offended by” Victor’s Little Secret and had not written
to Victoria’s Secret, would Victoria’s Secret have even brought the
case? What if the store had been selling men’s traditional
underwear? While dilution doctrine would say there is no
difference, if Victor’s Secret had been selling men’s underwear, I
think it would have been more clear to everyone that the
significant difference in the names meant that this really was not a
dilution case at all for the reasons I discussed before.
PROFESSOR BEEBE: I wonder, just quickly, about your
opinion of Judge Leval’s trademark jurisprudence.207 This is a
Second Circuit audience, Second Circuit location. Leval has
established the requirement that a trademark must be “inherently
distinctive” in order to receive anti-dilution protection.208 As New
York lawyers what are your views of that?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I already have said that I think it’s
ridiculous.209 Coke, which acquired distinctiveness for Coca Cola,
which was a cola drink originally made from a cocoa leafmaybe
still is, I don’t know, it gives me a lift. To say that because it was
not inherently distinctive it is not protected from dilution makes
absolutely no sense and certainly thwarts the objectives of the
FTDA. Judge Leval misread the statute and misunderstood what
“distinctive” in the trademark sense means.
MS. DRISCOLL: Well, the statute talks about distinctiveness,
whether it is acquired or not acquired.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes.
MS. DRISCOLL: So, I don’t know how he can get around the
fact that one of the factors in determining whether there is
207

See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
See id. at 215 (establishing that the mark be distinctive among the elements to state a
claim for dilution).
209
See supra note 146.
208
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protection is the extent of either inherent or acquired
distinctiveness. He ignored that completely.
PROFESSOR BEEBE: But the Supreme Court does cite
Nabisco in footnote number 5 of the Moseley opinion.210 A student
came into my office a week or two ago and based on that footnote,
the student was under the opinion that of course the Supreme Court
endorsed Laval’s “inherent distinctiveness” requirement.
MS. DRISCOLL: No, no, but he didn’t have that requirement
in Nabisco.211
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Okay.
MS. DRISCOLL: In that one, he gave protection for dilution
even though it was acquired distinctiveness. A few years later, he
wrote the opinion in The Children’s Place case where he included
the requirement that it had to be inherently distinctive.212
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Okay.
MS. DRISCOLL: He wrote both of them.
PROFESSOR BEEBE: Okay, great. I think that concludes this
panel. Thanks very much to the panelists for this excellent
discussion.
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See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 427 n.5.
See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216 (holding that plaintiff’s claim to stop defendant’s
injunction was denied after defendant proved that dilution of its product was likely).
212
See TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2000).
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